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COMMERCIALIZATION OF BUSINESS 
REPUTATION 
DAVID ADAM FRIEDMAN∗ 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Beginning in the late 1990s, online mediated reputation systems (MRS),1 such 
as Yelp and Angie’s List, changed the consumer decisionmaking process in 
marked ways, making inroads into how consumers buy products, travel, dine, and 
choose plumbers and electricians. MRS platforms draw in consumer users to 
generate reviews of their experiences, which the MRS then aggregates and 
presents in various forms to consumers who seek information about a business or 
offering. 
The impression made by the MRS presentation of reviews to consumers, 
however, reflects not only the raw inputs from consumer reviewers, but also the 
impact of the MRS revenue model. Businesses under review can pay for the 
opportunity to influence what consumers see when they seek MRS information. 
MRS advertising sales, promotional assistance, and reputation-management 
services, for example, all enable businesses to use the MRS platform to alter 
transactional behavior in favor of their business. The monetization of the MRS 
platform requires the platforms to present information differently than they 
would if they were only motivated by the purity of consumer education and 
information sharing. 
This article explores the ramifications of this apparent conflict for consumers 
and offers possible avenues for improvement and preservation of the valuable 
information offered through the MRS channel. 
The proliferation of MRS platforms unquestionably changed consumer 
information-gathering habits,2 just as the electronic retail channel acquired 
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1. Professor Eric Goldman appears to have been the first to use the term “mediated reputation
system.” Eric Goldman, The Regulation of Reputational Information, in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: 
ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 293, 294 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus eds., 2010). 
2. Yelp alone boasts well over 70 million unique users across multiple platforms. An Introduction
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impressive scale.3 Online consumer MRS platforms have transformed consumer 
shopping habits by establishing entirely new digital venues for shoppers to 
acquire and absorb data—such as peer experiences and opinions—about 
businesses and offerings. 
If this unique, fairly new data flow has exceptional social value, then 
preservation of the volume and integrity of this data through scrutiny of the 
context of its presentation should take higher priority than other recently-
identified advertising enforcement concerns.4 The practices that surfaced during 
recent class action litigation involving Angie’s List should urge more scrutiny of 
this information exchange. As part of a 2016 settlement, Angie’s List agreed to 
change disclosure practices related to advertising practices on its site.5 The 
plaintiffs alleged that Angie’s List failed to disclose to paid subscribers that it 
received payments from service providers for advertising—and that these 
payments affected provider ratings, review content, review availability, and site 
placement.6 In addition to changing these business practices, Angie’s List agreed 
to pay the class $1.4 million7 as it transitioned away from a subscription-reliant 
model. 
Were Angie’s List’s disclosure problems the product of inherent tension 
between the cultivation of a user community and advertisers? Should this tension 
warrant extra industrywide scrutiny of MRS business practices, including 
advertising placement practices? If pervasive, such integrity issues warrant 




to Yelp Metrics as of September 30, 2016, YELP, https://www.yelp.com/factsheet [https://perma.cc/AN4A-
4FBS] (last visited Nov. 27, 2016).  
 3.  Amazon alone, according to one Wall Street analyst, “accounted for 42% of all retail growth for 
2015 as a whole, up from the 22% it generated in 2014.” Rebecca Borison, Amazon Is Hogging a Huge 
Share of Growth in the Retail Industry, THESTREET (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.thestreet.com/story/ 
13444145/1/amazon-is-hogging-a-huge-share-of-growth-in-the-retail-industry.html [https://perma.cc/8S 
Q3-MYM8].  
 4.  The Federal Trade Commission recently promulgated the Enforcement Policy Statement on 
Deceptively Formatted Advertisements, identifying a host of concerns about a variety of advertising 
tactics involving misleading context for commercial information. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
ENFORCEMENT POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTIVELY FORMATTED ADVERTISEMENTS (2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/896923/151222deceptiveenforcement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T2YQ-VJKU] (requiring textual, auditory, or visual disclosures to distinguish 
advertising from non-commercial content). Concerns about MRS advertising differ from other 
comparators like advertorials in newspapers, or potential conflicts of interest that arise from news 
agencies accepting advertisements from businesses that reporters cover. The tensions within MRS 
advertising emerge because of unique background user expectations. MRS users engage the platform to 
access peer information, expecting a “clear picture” of peer opinion—and are met with targeted, 
temporal advertising often at a key moment of decisionmaking.  
 5.  Class Action Settlement Agreement, Moore v. Angie’s List, No. 15-1243-SD (E.D. Pa. June 24, 
2016). 
 6.  Conditional Amended Class Action Complaint at ¶¶ 1–14, Moore v. Angie’s List, No. 2:15-cv-
01243 (E.D. Pa. July 11, 2016). 
 7.  Class Action Settlement Agreement, Moore, at ¶¶ 19–20. 
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These corrections may involve, for example, disclosure of revenue sourcing 
or potential conflicts—at a level more exacting than the regulatory guidelines to 
advertisers for avoiding engagement in deceptive practices.8 The Federal Trade 
Commission’s (FTC) recent Enforcement Policy Statement on Deceptively 
Formatted Advertisements focuses on mandating disclosure that helps the 
consumer distinguish advertising and promotions from surrounding non-
commercial content.9 For MRS platforms, the unique tensions in the operating 
model may warrant especially higher standards for distinguishing non-
commercial content—or more frequent and focused enforcement. Like all 
advertising regulation, such interventions should be weighed against the real risk 
that intervention might impede the overall flow of information.10 
II 
A BRIEF CASE FOR ELEVATED SCRUTINY OF MEDIATED REPUTATION 
SYSTEMS 
Three principal factors emerge to justify special scrutiny of MRS platforms. 
First, MRS platforms have enjoyed broad success in developing a presence in 
consumer markets. The justification for scrutiny rests on the newfound social 
importance of these platforms. Yelp alone boasts millions of users.11 
Second, MRS platforms promote themselves as intermediary providers of 
user-generated content (UGC). Peer information carries more credibility with 
consumers than purely advertiser-generated content (AGC).12 The FTC’s 2011 
guidance for embedding peer endorsements within AGC13 reflected these 
concerns about the power of peer endorsements. 
Third, MRS platforms promote their presentation of neutral UGC (content 
not produced to generate self-interested sales) to create a user audience for 
persuasive AGC. Granted, this third factor is more controversial because it 
deploys the ambiguous term, “neutral.” Every content publisher or search engine 
makes choices of inclusion and priority of UGC presentation that leave a residue  
  
 
 8.  Note that the precise presentation of advertisements lies with the MRS, not the typical business 
purchasing a presence on the MRS platform. 
 9.  See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTIVELY 
FORMATTED ADVERTISEMENTS, supra note 4 (requiring textual, auditory, or visual disclosures to 
distinguish advertising from non-commercial content). 
 10.  See generally Richard Craswell, Regulating Deceptive Advertising: The Role of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 550 (1991) (defending the application of cost-benefit analysis to deceptive 
advertising regulation). 
 11.  See infra Part III.A. Yelp and others are singled out for the purposes of this article only because 
of their market leadership and presence, not because of any alleged unlawfulness of their practices. 
 12.  See David Adam Friedman, Debiasing Advertising: Balancing Risk, Hope, and Social Welfare, 
19 J.L. POL’Y 539, 577–82 (2010) (describing the power of peer endorsements). 
 13.  Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 255.2 
(2009). 
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of bias.14 Here, however, a different sort of concern emerges on top: classic search 
engine bias.15 
This article uses the term “neutrality” as shorthand to describe how MRS 
platforms convey, both expressly and implicitly, a clear picture and distillation of 
user opinion about a business or offering.16 When the MRS deviates from that 
“clear picture and distillation” through insertion or influence of AGC, this 
conception of neutrality fades. After all, rational advertisers have determined 
that investing in MRS promotions will yield a different result than if shoppers 
relied on the untouched, neutral UGC surfacing from reviews. 
This third factor emphasizes the tensions in the MRS model that present a 
dynamic worthy of scrutiny. The MRS platforms that stand independently as self-
sustaining business models present the most concern with respect to direct 
compromises of expected neutrality. “Standalone” platforms must generate 
substantially all revenue directly from the platform, rather than merely using the 
platform, as broader entities like Google or Facebook might, as a valuable 
“supportive” asset within a broader user-engagement ecosystem. 
III 
STANDALONE AND SUPPORTIVE MEDIATED REPUTATION SYSTEMS 
Over the past few decades, entities like Yelp17 and Angie’s List18 have 
established significant presences as dedicated, standalone MRS platforms. A 
standalone MRS builds a community of users, while aggregating and presenting 
the users’ observational data back to the public. This type of MRS generates 
revenue by providing advertisers—typically reviewed entities—access to that 
   
 
 14.  A decade ago, Eric Goldman observed that search engines maintained active editorial policies 
to produce socially desirable, meaningful results for users. “Every Internet venue accepting user-
submitted content inevitably gets attacked by unwanted content. If left untended, the venue inexorably 
degrades into anarchy.” Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism, 
9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 111, 119 n.31 (2006). His observations have been strikingly durable, especially when 
applied to the broader social media platforms that have flourished since. 
 15.  The leading MRS platforms make no bones about using algorithms to filter reviews for relevance 
and integrity. In that sense, the leading platforms promote the notion that users are receiving a stream of 
information that businesses have not tampered with by writing phony reviews for themselves or about 
competitors, for example. 
 16.  See, e.g., Angie’s List Commercial, Office Banter, YOUTUBE (Aug. 8, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ZC94C1Ni-Q [https://perma.cc/9N8Z-CSUD] (“Want feedback 
that’s unbiased? We’ve got 10 million verified reviews . . . Join [Angie’s List] for free.”); Angie’s List 
Commercial, What Goes Down, YOUTUBE (June 24, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch 
?v=CKpBfmtX3ME [https://perma.cc/C7JA-MNLR] (“That means everyone has access to our real 
reviews that we actually verify . . . so if you need a great plumber, find one at Angie’s List.”).  
 17. See About Us, YELP, http://www.yelp.com/about [https://perma.cc/VD4E-EADZ] (last visited 
July 27, 2016) (“Our purpose: to connect great people with great local businesses.”). 
 18. See About Us, ANGIE’S LIST, http://www.angieslist.com/aboutus [https://perma.cc/43UZ-PBFK] 
(last visited July 27, 2016) (“More than 3 million households nationwide check Angie’s List reviews to 
find the best local service providers. . . . The people who join Angie’s List are just like you—real folks 
looking for a way to find trustworthy companies that perform high-quality work.”). 
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platform. A supportive MRS provides the same function as the standalone MRS, 
but within the broader context of a larger user-engagement system. 
A. Standalone Models 
Standalone MRS platforms maximize enterprise value almost exclusively 
from the MRS by selling businesses access to their user bases. Advertising and 
promotions from the very entities under review provide a primary, direct 
financial underpinning of the standalone model. 
Presenting a neutral platform while financially supporting that platform with 
the presentation of non-neutral, persuasive information about reviewed entities, 
however, presents a regulatory question. What would result if regulators 
intervened to require all MRS platforms to go above and beyond current 
advertising disclosure standards, thus ensuring that consumers could clearly 
confront and discern commercial content and motives behind what they see on 
these platforms? Such requirements would burden standalone MRS platforms 
substantially because they would have to disclose (more prominently) direct links 
between their information presentation and advertiser influence. Supportive 
platforms, discussed in part III.B, might show a more diffuse link between user 
information presentation and advertiser influence, and may thus find advantage 
from such regulation. 
This sort of regulatory intervention could enable consumers to weigh search 
results and advertising with more awareness. Users would see more transparently 
how advertisers intervene to redirect them away from neutral search results. Such 
an approach, however, might also make the standalone MRS platform less 
economically viable, ultimately reducing the availability of potentially welfare-
enhancing peer information.19 
Regulatory intervention in information markets may yield net welfare 
improvements, but potential market changes must also be considered. In one 
post-intervention scenario, the standalone MRS platforms would operate with 
more transparency, but the platforms would have difficulty standing alone as 
independent, financially-viable entities. In this instance, standalone MRS 
platforms might, through merger or acquisition, find better homes within broader 
entities that would not depend almost exclusively on revenue flow from reviewed 
businesses. Broader entities would systemically benefit from the wider user base 
that established MRS platforms would bring to their environments. 
In other words, regulation might inspire standalone MRS platforms to 
migrate toward enhancing the user experience within larger social media or 
search engine ecosystems. A partial overview of the supportive MRS helps 
inform what that dynamic might look like. 
 
 19.  Eric Goldman credits the Communications Decency Act of 1996, Section 230 with enabling 
these reputation systems to thrive as valuable information hubs. Goldman, supra note 14, at 298. 47 
U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) renders these entities largely immune from civil liability for the comments of users. 
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B. Supportive Models 
Google and Facebook fall into the supportive category because they center 
their gravity of user engagement on, respectively, search and social networking 
applications, and only at most secondarily on their embedded MRS platforms. 
They are not as directly dependent on MRS platform revenue as Yelp and 
Angie’s List. Google and Facebook use consumer reviews as an integrated tool 
to engage users on their sites, exposing users to more paid promotions and 
advertising. 
Amazon.com (Amazon), is too big to ignore, and arguably comprises a 
unique category of retail entity. For purposes of evaluating its core MRS system, 
Amazon’s securities filings declare that the company’s “primary source of 
revenue is the sale of a wide range of products and services to customers.”20 
Though Amazon mentions advertising within a broad list of other revenue 
sources, consumer sales revenue has been deemed the utmost priority, leading 
Amazon to look primarily like a retail seller and the MRS function to look like a 
customer engagement feature, rather than a primary driver of revenue.21 User 
reviews are, however, integral to the customer experience, and advertising and 
promotions still strongly influence what the customer sees. Nonetheless, the MRS 
portion of Amazon that gathers and relays reviews and ratings plays only a small 
role in the prodigious Amazon business model.22 
In contrast, Yelp and Angie’s List exemplify business models centered almost 
completely on the MRS platform.23 These entities generate cash by selling their 
 
 20.  Amazon.com, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 18 (Apr. 6, 2016). Thin margins from 
proprietary direct sales could still draw a massive global user base to the Amazon platform for advertising 
revenue and payments from third-parties to sell on the site. Though some have attempted to explain the 
business model, there remains much mystique about Amazon’s strategy. See, e.g., Jay Yarow, Former 
Amazon Employee Explains How the Company’s Business Model Really Works, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 28, 
2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/amazons-profits-what-people-dont-understand-2013-10 [https:// 
perma.cc/GU4V-VS3M]. 
 21.  “We also offer other services such as compute, storage, and database offerings, fulfillment, 
publishing, digital content subscriptions, advertising, and co-branded credit cards.” Amazon.com, Inc., 
Annual Report (Form 10-K) 18 (Apr. 6, 2016).  
 22.  Amazon’s use of the MRS platform and approach toward promotion and advertising warrants 
unique and detailed treatment that this short article cannot offer. Amazon engages in an increasingly 
complex and diverse array of marketing and sales activities. See Amazon.com Announces Third Quarter 
Sales up 29% to $32.7 Billion (Oct. 27, 2016), http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=176060 
&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=2216765 [https://perma.cc/UT9L-5B7G]. The MRS feature on Amazon 
increasingly becomes a minor feature compared with innovations like Alexa. 
 23.  Yelp’s front door displays a simple ranked list of businesses, associated with aggregate ratings 
and number of ratings. A cursory search of Yelp for businesses in Durham, North Carolina lists first a 
sushi restaurant (along with its star ranking and number of user ratings), and then several other dining 
establishments in a ranked order. See https://www.yelp.com/search?find_desc=&find_loc=durham 
%2C+NC&ns=1 [https://perma.cc/Y7L8-URRQ] (last visited Oct. 22, 2016) (on file with author). When 
the user clicks on the link for that first restaurant, the user scrolls past two paid advertisements for other 
restaurants before the user encounters any peer reviews. See https://www.yelp.com/biz/m-sushi-durham 
[https://perma.cc/9CF6-MXQK] (last visited Oct. 22, 2016) (on file with author). See also sources cited 
supra note 16 (excerpting Angie’s List commercials). Avvo provides another example, offering client 
reviews of lawyers, along with advice forums and access to lawyers. “Imagine having nearly every licensed 
lawyer in the US right at your fingertips, the moment you need help. Avvo has that, plus detailed profiles, 
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MRS audience to advertisers, whereas the other platforms generate cash by 
selling their broader audience to advertisers, or by selling products and services. 
When standalone MRS entities sell promotion and advertising on their 
implicitly neutral platforms, the basic presence of persuasion puts the platform’s 
neutrality and authenticity at risk. Unlike supportive MRS platforms, standalone 
entities rely heavily on soliciting revenue from advertisers who appear on their 
platforms. For the standalones, a patina of persuasive messaging coats the top of 
their implicitly neutral data presentations. For example, a user search for a 
nearby Thai restaurant may yield a list of rated establishments, but the user might 
have to scroll through paid links to other restaurants first—and the user might 
click on an advertised link first, thereby short-circuiting the comparative, peer-
informed shopping process that the MRS purports to promote. Even though Yelp 
and Angie’s List disclose the primary source of their revenue on their websites, 
users will not readily encounter those disclosures in the ordinary course of 
searching for businesses, but only upon examination of the nonsearch part of 
their sites.24 
C. Dissecting The Standalone Model 
A dissection of the standalone MRS business model exposes the inherent 
tension between building a loyal user community and generating revenue from 
reviewed businesses. Yelp, Angie’s List, Avvo, and ConsumerAffairs operate 
standalone MRS platforms, each specializing in reviews of different retail sectors. 
Yelp and Angie’s List focus on reviews of local businesses, with the latter placing 
an emphasis on homeowner services. Avvo collects information about attorneys 
from clients and peers.25 ConsumerAffairs offers general business reviews 
beyond the geolocation-centric focus of Yelp.26 All of these neutral platforms 
source significant advertising, promotional, and reputation-management revenue 
from businesses reviewed on their sites—businesses seeking to improve or raise 
their profile, to nudge or otherwise persuade consumers to choose them over a 
competitor. Yelp and ConsumerAffairs in particular offer different approaches 
 
reviews, and the Avvo Rating.” See About Us, AVVO, https://www.avvo.com/about_avvo#founded 
[https://perma.cc/Q29B-7T3C] (last visited July 27, 2016).  
 24.  These disclosures appear, but on secondary non-search web pages that would prove difficult to 
access through mobile applications. If a user clicks on the “About Yelp” link on the bottom of the 
homepage, they will reach a page that tells the visitor “10 things you should know about Yelp.” Yelp lists 
at number six: “Yelp makes money by selling ads to local businesses—you’ll see these clearly labeled 
‘Yelp Ads’ around the site.” About Us, YELP, https://www.yelp.com/about [https://perma.cc/JV7E-P25V] 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2016). Angie’s List does something similar. See About Us, ANGIE’S LIST, 
https://www.angieslist.com/faq/how-does-angie-s-list-make-money/ [https://perma.cc/P2K4-L4UP] (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2017) (disclosing that revenue comes from nominal membership fees as well as advertising 
fees from Certified Service Providers). 
 25.  For an in-depth analysis of the impact of online reviews on the market for legal services, 
including the general cognitive and psychological impact of online reviews on reviewers and the reviewed, 
see Cassandra Burke Robertson, Online Reputation Management in Attorney Regulation, 29 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 97 (2016). 
 26.  See generally, CONSUMER AFFAIRS: RESEARCH. REVIEW. RESOLVE., CONSUMERAFFAIRS, 
http://www.consumeraffairs.com [https://perma.cc/9LBX-3NUS] (last visited Sept. 18, 2016). 
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to standalone MRS business practices. Exploring both of these different models 
exposes common fundamental tensions between serving users and serving 
advertisers. 
Yelp presents the highest-profile example of a standalone MRS finding a 
successful commercial balance between engaging users through authentic reviews 
and sourcing revenue from those reviewed.27 Yelp boasts impressive user 
engagement. In the first quarter of 2016, Yelp reported (domestically) over 
seventy-seven million unique desktop users, sixty-eight million mobile web users, 
and twenty-one million “unique app device” users.28 Yelp also maintains a 
database of over 101 million freely-contributed reviews, demonstrating the depth 
of the user community and the mass and scope of its data.29 A cursory look at 
these numbers indicates that an impressive base of consumers trusts Yelp and 
uses the platform as a search and shopping tool. 
Businesses recognize the exceptional value of advertising and appearing on 
promotion on Yelp.30 Yelp reported nearly $450 million in locally-driven 
advertising revenue in 2015 and $31 million in brand advertising, numbers that 
have increased steadily over the past several years.31 Retailers use advertising to 
influence and persuade,32 and Yelp’s platform provides a ready audience of 
decision makers. 
Yelp offers to sell advertising and promotional dollars to reviewed entities 
seeking to make a positive impression or a raised profile amidst real, 
unmanipulated ratings, but other MRS platforms sell the opportunity for 
businesses to control the appearance of negative ratings. 
Consider the business model of the for-profit MRS, ConsumerAffairs. 
ConsumerAffairs unambiguously proclaims independence: 
“ConsumerAffairs.com is an independent Web-based consumer news and 
resource center.”33 ConsumerAffairs tells consumers that the site “empowers 
[them] by providing a forum for their complaints and a means to be contacted by 
lawyers if their complaints have legal merit. . . . [C]omplaints and reviews may be 
published, shared with the news media and reviewed by attorneys at no cost to 
 
 27.  Yelp achieved profitability in 2012 and profits have increased steadily since. See YELP, YELP 
INVESTOR PRESENTATION Q1 14, http://www.yelp-ir.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=250809&p=irol-irhome 
[https://perma.cc/SSF5-43X3] (last visited Sept. 18, 2016) (on file with author). 
 28.  YELP, YELP 1Q16 DATA SHEET, http://www.yelp-ir.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=250809&p=irol-
irhome  [https://perma.cc/SSF5-43X3] (last visited Sept. 18, 2016) (on file with author). 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Perhaps, in part, because the return on investment in their advertising surpasses competition, 
according to a Boston Consulting Group study the company cites. See YELP, YELP INVESTOR 
PRESENTATION Q1, http://www.yelp-ir.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=250809&p=irol-irhome [https://perma.cc 
/SSF5-43X3] (last visited Sept. 18, 2016) (on file with author). 
 31.  Yelp, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 51 (Feb. 24, 2016). 
 32.  See Sara Haan, The Persuasion Route of the Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (2000) 
(comparing commercial advertising strategies to legal reasoning).  
 33.  FAQ, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, https://www.consumeraffairs.com/about/faq/#about-us 
[https://perma.cc/4W7W-FMDM] (last visited July 25, 2016). 
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you.”34 ConsumerAffairs has presented a distinct face, until just recently 
promoting on its website’s “about us” section the notion that it was “a consumer 
news and advocacy organization . . . .”35 ConsumerAffairs since eliminated that 
language from its “about us” description, now declaring: 
We believe everyone deserves to make smart decisions based on unbiased feedback and 
research-driven information. Consumers and business owners need a trustworthy and 
neutral platform to share and respond to reviews. Brands need an efficient and effective 
platform to respond to feedback and engage with their customers. ConsumerAffairs is 
the place online where brands and their customers can connect.36 
As Professor Eric Goldman observed in June, 2016, compared with the other 
MRS platforms that “have more traditional editorial and commercial practices,” 
the “current business practices [of ConsumerAffairs] probably aren’t going to 
impress you.”37 Nonetheless, a closer look at these practices of ConsumerAffairs 
highlights some of the inherent tensions in the MRS business model. A recent 
civil case revealed that ConsumerAffairs “modified its business model in order 
to earn increased revenue by inducing manufacturers and providers . . . reviewed 
on the ConsumerAffairs website to pay fees to become accredited members 
entitled to preferential treatment in the display and use of consumer ratings.”38 
Paid preferential treatment for businesses in the display of consumer ratings 
appears in tension with claims that the site empowers consumers. 
ConsumerAffairs generates a revenue stream from businesses wishing to 
preserve their reputation from unanswered criticism on the ConsumerAffairs 
website, charging fees for various services. In marketing material for businesses 
labeled “We’ve Got Your Back,” ConsumerAffairs offered to “partner” with 
several “brands.”39 ConsumerAffairs claims to provide businesses with such 
 
 34.  Review, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, https://www.consumeraffairs.com/review/ [https://perma.cc/ 
MV2M-ZYCM] (last visited July 25, 2016). 
 35. About ConsumerAffairs.com, CONSUMERAFFAIRS, http://web.archive.org/web/201604220 
50152/https://www.consumeraffairs.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/F7YC-VHGF] (Apr. 22, 2016) (last 
visited March 11, 2017) (on file with author). A magistrate referred to that since-deleted language in 
recent litigation. See Magistrate Report, Consumer Cellular, Inc. v. ConsumerAffairs.com, 3:15-CV-
1908-PK, 2016 WL 3176602 (D. Ore. Feb. 29, 2016) (slip opinion); Trial court adoption of magistrate 
report (D. Ore. June 2, 2016).  
36. About ConsumerAffairs.com, CONSUMERAFFAIRS, https://www.consumeraffairs.com/about/ [htt 
ps://perma.cc/Y7TN-JD5J] (last visited Mar. 11, 2017).  
 37.  Eric Goldman, Review Website Gets Hammered In Court–Consumer Cellular v. 
ConsumerAffairs, TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW BLOG (June 5, 2016), http://blog.ericgoldman. 
org/archives/2016/06/review-website-gets-hammered-in-court-consumer-cellular-v-consumeraffairs.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8ERH-AJ5X]. Although many of the platforms find themselves involved in litigation 
brought by reviewed businesses, some ongoing litigation looms especially ominously over 
ConsumerAffairs. See Magistrate Report, Consumer Cellular, Inc. v. ConsumerAffairs.com, 3:15-CV-
1908-PK, 2016 WL 3176602 (D. Ore. Feb. 29, 2016) (slip opinion); Trial court adoption of magistrate 
report (D. Ore. June 2, 2016). For an extensive discussion about the potential implications of the case for 
other review sites, see Goldman, Review Website, supra note 37.  
 38.  Consumer Cellular, Inc., 2016 WL 3176602 at *4. 
 39.  See generally We’ve Got Your Back: 7 Reasons Why Your Brand Needs ConsumerAffairs, 
CONSUMERAFFAIRS (2014), https://www.truthinadvertising.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/CA.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9M67-ZVHT] (last visited July 25, 2016) (on file with author). Note that the back that 
ConsumerAffairs claims to have is not the consumer, despite the name of the company, but the back of 
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positives as accessibility to a broad audience,40 consumer faith in the peer 
opinions they gathered,41 help in encouraging customers to write positive 
reviews,42 access to detailed information about their reviews,43 assistance in 
turning consumer “brand assassins” into “brand ambassadors,”44 and assistance 
with search engine optimization.45 
Although ConsumerAffairs has a tiny presence46 compared to Yelp and 
Angie’s List, and operates in distinctly different ways, all of these standalone 
MRS entities share some broad attributes.47 They attract user reviews and present 
them under a banner of objective authenticity. Then, through sales of advertising, 
promotional access, reputational management, and other platform access, they 
all invite businesses to alter the transactional behavior of users in favor of their 
business or brand. 
Yelp’s financial statements indicate that it apparently serves advertisers well, 
but could the MRS model serve consumers better? Could regulators engender a 
purer experience for consumers without significantly disrupting the valuable flow 
of data? The answer may rest with adjusting the rules applied to “native 
advertising”—commercial content “that bears a similarity to the news, feature 
articles, product reviews, entertainment, and other material that surrounds it 
online.”48 Regulators could compel MRS platforms to elevate their native- 
 
 
those reviewed by consumers on its website.   
 40.  ConsumerAffairs warns businesses about the perils of ignoring reviews. “Now, imagine for a 
moment your brand is a candidate in the next presidential election. What would happen if you completely 
ignored certain voters and their collective voice? How would they consider the issues that are important 
if you didn’t respond to them? Citizens would feel frustrated, betrayed and insignificant, and you would 
alienate part of your constituent base.” Id. at 3. Concededly, ConsumerAffairs appears to be an MRS 
industry outlier with respect to tenor of message, but was this communication just a nakedly honest 
revelation about the basic standalone MRS model? 
 41.  Id. at 4. 
 42.  Id. at 5 (“While we can’t change customers’ star ratings for you, we can help you convince 
customers to change those ratings themselves, and help you gather more reviews which could improve 
your overall star rating. In addition, we can verify that your reviews are posted by real customers (and 
you can dispute those that are not).”).  
 43.  Id. at 6. 
 44.  Id. at 7 (“Partners” get the opportunity to respond aggressively to “brand assassins.” The 
implication is that non-partners lack this level of access. “When a Brand Assassin posts an extremely 
negative review about your brand, we not only work to verify its validity, we offer a dispute resolution 
window of 48 hours before the review is posted publically [sic].”). 
 45.  Id. at 8. 
 46.  ConsumerAffairs claims roughly three percent of the user base of Yelp. See id. at 3. 
 47.  See Who is ConsumerAffairs Really Advocating For?, TRUTH IN ADVERTISING (Oct. 21, 2014), 
https://www.truthinadvertising.org/consumer-affairs-com/ [https://perma.cc/2LZX-ZB8U] (“The 
[Electronic Retailing Self-Regulation Program] a division of the Council of Better Business Bureaus . . . 
determined that ConsumerAffairs did not adequately disclose its paid affiliation with company members 
on its website and recommended it do it in a more clear and conspicuous manner.”). 
 48.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, NATIVE ADVERTISING: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS (2015), https://www.ftc 
.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/native-advertising-guide-businesses [https://perma.cc/JQ4X-
5DWU]. 
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advertising disclosure standards above and beyond those recently set forth in 
the recent FTC Policy Statement,49 as discussed in part IV. 
D. The Role Of MRS Internal Standards 
Yelp recognizes that authenticity of information supplies lifeblood to its 
business model, and perhaps to instill user confidence, discloses, to some extent, 
the self-regulatory measures the company installed to ensure integrity. Most 
significantly, Yelp uses proprietary “automated recommendation software” to 
analyze the relevance, reliability, and utility of each review.50 Yelp’s software has 
guided the company to designate twenty-two percent of user reviews as “not 
recommended.”51 Use of this software has provoked some controversy because 
Yelp must keep the algorithm opaque to prevent businesses from gaming it.52 
Nonetheless, Yelp recognizes that preservation of review integrity, apart from 
the imprint of advertising, proves important for its viability. 
Despite the hassles associated with deploying this software, Yelp persists in 
its campaign to prevent review manipulation. As part of its self-regulatory 
strategy, Yelp even launches “sting operations” to expose pay-per-review 
operations, actively cooperates with civil authorities in their investigations, brings 
civil actions against businesses engaging in deceptive practices on the platform, 
and tags tampering businesses with “consumer alerts” to warn users of suspicious 
activity on a page.53 
Yelp goes far to ensure that businesses do not tamper with reviews, which 
would reduce consumer trust in the platform that they sell to advertisers. In 
maintaining these internal standards, Yelp protects the platform from unpaid 
manipulation from reviewed entities, but leaves consumers alone to contend with 
advertiser-driven manipulation of the user experience. 
With these self-imposed and publicized efforts to police the Yelp platform, 
Yelp’s facilitation of data availability enhances market efficiency, but only if 
consumers can adequately distinguish the native advertising embedded on its 
platform from the context of the other neutral information. In general, 
inexpensive and easily-accessible reputational information improves the quality 
 
 49.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTIVELY FORMATTED 
ADVERTISEMENTS 11–14 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/8969 
23/151222deceptiveenforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZH2-X4JW]. 
 50.  Yelp, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 11 (Feb. 24, 2016). 
 51.  Id. (seven percent of the reviews are removed completely for violating terms of service). 
 52.  This opacity generated an unsupported suspicion that Yelp tampers with reviews to punish 
entities that choose not to advertise. “For years, Yelp has been dogged by allegations that it manipulates 
user reviews . . . businesses aren’t likely to stop grumbling about these concerns any time soon.” Eric 
Goldman, Court Says Yelp Doesn’t Extort Businesses, FORBES (Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/ericgoldman/2014/09/03/court-says-yelp-doesnt-extort-businesses/#142c19d76e4a [https://perma.cc 
/BA54-LJV2]; see, e.g., Levitt v. Yelp, 765 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2014) (animal hospital claiming Yelp review 
manipulation); Demetriades v. Yelp, 228 Cal. App. 4th 294 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (restauranteur directly 
attacking integrity of Yelp’s representations about algorithm).   
 53.  Yelp, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 11 (Feb. 24, 2016). 
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of consumer decisionmaking and overall market resource allocation.54 MRS 
platforms compete against one another for users on the basis of the “reputation 
of reputation systems,”55 which could inspire a race to the top in quality and 
integrity. 
Despite Yelp’s laudable—and market-driven—efforts to police the integrity 
of its site, paid advertising purposely nudges users away from the neutral outputs 
of Yelp’s automated recommendation software and toward transactions that 
favor the advertiser. Yelp boasts to investors of the high return-on-investment 
from advertising spending on the site.56 This high return is a direct result of Yelp’s 
enabling businesses to present themselves in the context of an authentic platform. 
But no matter the level of internal scrutiny of reviews, users still confront reviews 
of paid advertisers when they visit.57 
If users visit a platform expecting a pure distillation of peer reviews, should 
regulators devote extra scrutiny to advertising appearing on the platform? The 
FTC’s Enforcement Policy Statement on Deceptively Formatted Advertisements 
warns advertisers that if consumers lack the ability to know the source of an 
advertising message, the message could be deemed deceptive.58 
With MRS platforms, the emphatic neutrality of peer endorsements creates a 
context that requires disclosure beyond what the FTC illustrates for  
advertorials.59 The formal guidance for businesses on native advertising practices 
offers seventeen hypothetical advertising scenarios, involving a variety of 
platforms, but not the MRS—a notable omission.60 Any change in enforcement 
posture that would require more conspicuous disclosure than the current native 
advertising baseline would exceed this newly-minted guidance. Even calling out 
the MRS model through a single hypothetical advertising illustration would 
advance this notion. 
  
 
 54.  Eric Goldman, The Regulation of Reputational Information, supra note 1, at 295–96. Goldman 
also considers the risks of “distorted decision making from reputational information.” Id. at 303. 
 55.  Id. at 296 (“[R]eputation systems . . . typically seek to establish their own reputation. . .[T]he 
reputation of reputation systems . . . is the invisible hand that guides reputational information . . . to guide 
the invisible hand of individual uncoordinated decisions by marketplace actors.” The reputation of 
reputation systems “allows the reputation system to earn consumer trust as a credible source . . . or to be 
drummed out of the market for lack of credibility (such as the now-defunct anonymous gossip website 
JuicyCampus).”).  
 56.  See YELP, YELP INVESTOR PRESENTATION Q1, supra note 27. 
 57.  Yelp demonstrates that as reviews accumulate in a local market, advertising revenue tends to 
follow. See id. at 26 (using Philadelphia market as example). 
 58.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTIVELY FORMATTED 
ADVERTISEMENTS, supra note 49, at 1. 
 59.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, NATIVE ADVERTISING: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESSES, supra note 48, at 
Ex.1–Ex.6.  
 60.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, NATIVE ADVERTISING: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESSES, supra note 48 
(mentioning “product reviews” as content worthy of protection from deceptive native advertisings, but 
no illustrations are offered, and this is the only brief mention). 
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The context of this type of advertising—the presentation of peer 
endorsements—warrants concern when considering core, primary consumer 
motives for visiting these platforms and the potential for redirection from an 
expected neutral search. Otherwise, what could be an enhanced-information 
shopping process might turn instead into a diverted one that deviates from 
consumer expectations. 
IV 
IMPACT OF INCREMENTAL REGULATION 
The FTC affords MRS platforms considerable latitude in the presentation of 
advertising. The advertiser shall not engage in “deception”—the misleading of 
consumers about material facts related to an offering.61 In this instance, the 
“materiality” of concern lies in the “nature or source of advertising.”62 
On this subject, the FTC explains: 
Misleading representations or omissions about an advertisement’s true nature or source 
. . . are likely to affect consumers’ behavior with regard to the . . . advertisement. . . . 
Consumers with such a misleading impression, for example, are likely to give added 
credence to advertising messages communicated and to interact with advertising 
content with which they otherwise would have decided not to interact.63 
Further, the FTC deems “certain misleading formats to be presumptively 
material.”64 Invoking concerns about peer endorsements, the FTC Policy 
Statement notes that “false claims that advertising and promotional messages 
reflect the independent, impartial views, opinions, or experiences of ordinary 
consumers or experts are presumed material.”65 
MRS platforms may avoid making such false claims through clear and 
conspicuous disclosures of sponsorship. Nonetheless, mishandling of peer 
information elevates the risks of undue “added credence” and consumer 
interaction with content that “they otherwise would have decided not to 
interact.”66 
A different, stronger presumption of materiality should apply to the context 
of MRS advertising. Under the current FTC approach to native advertising, MRS 
platforms may not flagrantly “misrepresent [the] source or nature”67 of their 
advertising, nor blatantly trick consumers into “opening doors”68 on which they 
otherwise might not have knocked. As argued above, however, higher standards 
are likely warranted. 
  
 
 61.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTIVELY FORMATTED 
ADVERTISEMENTS, supra note 49, at 14 (citing Deception Policy Statement, 103 F.T.C. at 182). 
 62.  Id. at 15. 
 63.  Id. 14–15. 
 64.  Id. at 15. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id.  
 67.  Id. 3–6. 
 68.  Id. 7–8. 
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Consumers open doors because the doors exist on a platform perceived as 
supremely objective and authentic. Unfortunately, opening a door created for the 
purpose of persuasion will not yield an authentically-driven transactional 
outcome. Here, the gap between expectation about the prospective use of MRS 
information and the actual experience may prove material. Although consumers 
may never know of any undue manipulation, the use of neutrality and 
authenticity as a lure to view persuasive information could lead to suboptimal 
transactions and welfare loss.69 
For logistical reasons, any added burdens of compliance must fall on the MRS 
platforms, rather than advertisers, because advertisers have limited control of the 
placement of their advertising. The MRS platforms have control over the layout 
of their sites and mobile presentations, enabling them to control compliance with 
current enforcement policy. Advertisers hope for a high return from their 
marketing investment, but may lack ultimate control over the algorithms that 
drive contextual placement. 
Potential regulation shifts welfare, and primary and secondary effects must 
factor into any cost-benefit calculation weighing the merits of the proposed 
intervention.70 The first-order risk of implementing additional disclosure 
requirements resides in the impact from the extra expense of compliance, which 
might affect the financial viability of MRS entities. A more significant second-
order risk is that enhanced disclosure would dampen the MRS platform model, 
impinging the collection, usage, and flow of the information for valid purposes. 
If enhanced disclosure is effective, users will have more information, but the 
advertising might also be less effective. If advertiser return-on-investment 
diminishes enough, advertising dollars will flow elsewhere and marginally 
viable—but still socially valuable—platforms may disappear. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The social benefits of MRS platforms can be realized without undue 
distortions from advertising by reviewed entities. Regulators should weigh 
whether existing native advertising disclosure requirements suffice, and then 
consider whether the stakes have been heightened by the neutral appearance of 
the platform. A careful information intervention would give consumers a more 
complete picture of what the MRS presentation means, leading to consumers 
making better transactional decisions with this data. 
 
 
 69.  See Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 
491, 506–07 (1981) (generally describing market imperfections and distortions that can result from 
advertising and signal competition). 
 70.  Id. at 501 (“The problem, at bottom, is that there is no easy way of distinguishing deception from 
the larger problem of inadequate consumer information . . . . However, perfect decision making is not 
ever possible, so the real issue is when the government can or ought to intervene in the information 
market to improve the market’s performance.”).  
